Rocco D’Ambrosca: 11/05/2009
It has been said by many, but most notably by Newton, “If I can see further than anyone else, it is only because I am standing on the shoulders of giants.” Just as in the fields of science, the theories, concepts, and ideas in the different realms of philosophy are built upon and argued among those participating within that specific field. Scientists share their data, findings, and experiments with each other in the hopes of discovering validation or refutation of their theories, so that scientific knowledge can move forward. Thus is the same with Philosophy; with every Philosopher, but the very earliest, having all built upon, destroyed, or simply elaborated upon the existing philosophical ideas of their predecessors or even their contemporaries. When Martin Heidegger published Being and Time it was read by many, including a French philosopher named Jean-Paul Sartre. Inspired by Heidegger’s work, Sartre published Existentialism is a Humanism using some of Heidegger’s and other existentialists’ ideas and theories as a basis. This resulted in the publication of Letter on Humanism by Heidegger in an attempt to correct what he saw as Sartre’s misinterpretation of his philosophy. The following will discuss Sartre’s Existentialism is a Humanism and Heidegger’s Letter on Humanism individually, followed by a contrasting of the two, and finally an attempt at creating a rapprochement between them.
Sartre’s Existentialism is a Humanism is grounded primarily in the statement, “existence precedes essence” (Sartre 13), which he claims to be the common thread among all existentialists including Heidegger. Sartre defines existentialism as such, “we mean a doctrine which makes human life possible and, in addition, declares that every truth and every action implies a human setting and a human subjectivity” (Sartre 10). It is this human framework of existentialism that he will use to create his humanism. The claim that, “existence precedes essence” (Sartre 13), is first used in reverse to illustrate the stark contrast of man from everything else. He uses the example of a paper-cutter as something that has a definition and/or essence before it is created or exists; saying, “for the paper-cutter, essence—that is, the ensemble of both the production routines and the properties which enable it to be both produced and defined—precedes existence” (Sartre 13). The essence of the paper-cutter must exist beforehand or else its entire structure and form would be impossible to predict and thus would never come into existence. Sartre explains the statement, “existence precedes essence” (Sartre 13), by saying, “it means that, first of all, man exists, turns up, appears on the scene, and, only afterwards, defines himself. If man, as the existentialist conceives him, is indefinable, it is because at first he is nothing. Only afterward will he be something, and he himself will have made what he will be” (Sartre 15). Sartre has put all emphasis on man as the definer of himself, or in his words, “man is nothing else but what he makes of himself” (Sartre 15). “Not only is man what he conceives himself to be, but he is also only what he wills himself to be after this thrust toward existence. Man is nothing else but what he makes of himself” (Sartre 15).
Sartre sums up the statement, “existence precedes essence” (Sartre 13), quite simply when he says, “Man is at the start a plan which is aware of itself” (Sartre 16). “Man is nothing else than his plan; he exists only to the extent that he fulfills himself; he is therefore nothing else than the ensemble of his acts, nothing else than his life” (Sartre 32). Sartre uses this evolving definition of man for the foundations of individual personal responsibility and ethics. “If existence really does precede essence, man is responsible for what he is” (Sartre 16). This responsibility goes further than the individual to the rest of mankind, “thus existentialism’s first move is to make every man aware of what he is and to make the full responsibility of his existence rest on him. And when we say that a man is responsible for himself, we do not only mean that he is responsible for his own individuality, but that he is responsible for all men” (Sartre 16). Every endeavor and action that the individual undertakes reflects upon all other men in so that we constantly influence and shape each other’s lives unconsciously. Just as an artist or musician is inspired by the works of others, each of us through our own actions and choices influence others to do the same or opposite upon reflection. “In fact, in creating the man that we want to be, there is not a single one of our acts which does not at the same time create an image of man as we think he ought to be”; “thus our responsibility is much greater than we might have supposed, because it involves all mankind” (Sartre 17). “In choosing myself, I choose man” (Sartre 18). Further, “If existence really does precede essence, there is no explaining things away by reference to a fixed and given human nature. In other words, there is no determinism, man is free, man is freedom” (Sartre 23). Sartre believes this freedom to be inescapable and even frightening to man saying, “man is condemned to be free. Condemned, because he did not create himself, yet, in other respects is free; because, once thrown into the world, he is responsible for everything he does” (Sartre 23). Something about this responsibility is somehow absolutely exhilaratingly ecstatically freeing, and at the same time almost completely repulsive! How could such a paradox even exist?! It seems Sartre’s humanism is centered on this paradox and trying to awaken everyone to it, so that we can all truly embrace this freedom and the responsibility that naturally comes with it to fulfill our true potential in the creation of ourselves.
Heidegger’s Letter on Humanism chooses to focus on the potential of man and his capabilities for action and accomplishment as his true essence rather than the inverse applied in Sartre’s Existentialism is a Humanism. Heidegger spends the length of this work defining and continually refining his model of humanism as an attunement to Being. “What is being? It is It itself” (Heidegger 234), is consistent with the increasingly vague and convoluted language that Heidegger uses throughout his Letter on Humanism. The problem lies in his approach to defining his humanism and his philosophy in general. Instead of taking one unifying concept anddeveloping it until it is concretely understood, he takes several vague concepts, terms, invented terms, and increasingly confuses them with each other interchanging and reinterpreting everything as he goes. This horrid mutation occurs until he has undone everything he has even most remotely accomplished; leaving you completely dazed and confused wondering how he was ever allowed to even publish. Only since Hegel have I seen such a bastardization of language. I’m sure there is some wisdom to be found in Heidegger’s humanism, but I’d concede that only he and the institutionally insane have a chance of understanding; assuming Heidegger even knew what he was trying to accomplish.
The only substantial ideas that can be drawn from Heidegger’s humanism is the belief that our essence is being, or what this author understands to be unlimited potential of consciousness, and we bring this to life through language in our ability to think. “Thinking attends to the clearing of Being in that it puts its saying of Being into language as the home of ek-sistence. Thus thinking is a deed. But a deed that also surpasses all praxis. Thinking towers above action and production, not through the grandeur of its achievement and not as a consequence of its effect, but through the humbleness of its inconsequential accomplishment” (Heidegger 262). This condemnation of action is a direct attack against Sartre’s humanism.
As mentioned earlier, Sartre focuses on man’s actions as defining him, while Heidegger focuses on man’s potential to act and ability to think in his attunement to being. Obviously these are two radically different positions and outlooks. However, even Heidegger is able to admit that both of their humanisms are existential saying, “Sartre’s key proposition about the priority of existential over essentia does, however, justify using the name “existentialism” as an appropriate title for a philosophy of this sort” (Heidegger 232). So, in the end Heidegger’s attempt to rebut Sartre falls quite embarrassingly flat to this reader. Sartre comes off as a brilliantly simple, yet elegantly complex, philosopher who can give lasting words of wisdom with commonsensical utilitarian application; while Heidegger leaves you with the impression of some drunken, ego centric, raving mystic, who couldn’t explain the most simple of things without making you give up all of your current beliefs and logical understanding.